(PETERBOROUGH, ON)  Following a briefing on May 10, 2010 with regard to the Peterborough Rail Study presented by Metrolinx, I stated that the figures released by Metrolinx and posted on their website are consistent with the findings that were highlighted as requiring further attention by both my office as well as significant railway third party sources.
 
In attempting to demonstrate iron-clad confidence in their findings, Metrolinx goes to great efforts to emphasize the experience of the parties involved in establishing both infrastructure and operational costing - however they largely ignore their professional findings throughout the body of the report.
 

For Example
 
Metrolinx maintains that the cost of upgrading the Havelock sub-division (currently operated by CP Rail as the Kawartha Lakes Railway) has been established by Hatch Mott MacDonald as $329 million assuming route “C” is the desired option -  in the main report they in fact state it is $351 million.
 
In reviewing the document in February I requested the detailed table that related to their calculation. Hatch Mott MacDonald did in fact provide me with a detailed copy of these calculations which totaled
only $176 million.  From this figure, an independent third party with significant railway experience indicated more than $21.5 million in savings could be found and provided Metrolinx with these specific rec- ommendations in February.  This nets the professional costing of the necessary upgrades to the KLR including stations, crossings, parking and infrastructure out to a grand total of $155.5 million.  Considering these facts, why does the Metrolinx report then suggest that the findings were $351 million when they are in fact established as $155.5 million by industry experts?
 
In establishing the ridership demand for the proposed service, IBI has determined a ridership demand of 1900 persons per day at inception.  This number is double the figure that I determined in my first re-
port and in line with my ridership update report.  However, in determining the cost of operations, Metrolinx has provided only the expenses without including any fair revenues in their business case.
 
In February, it was recommended to Metrolinx by an independent expert third party that as a measure of both dramatically reducing the cost of acquisition of rolling stock as well as ongoing operations that
they consider the use of Diesel Mobile Units (DMU’s), as found in my original report.  During the meeting held in Peterborough on May 10th, Metrolinx officials indicated that their cost of operations not including fair revenues ranged between $13 and $25 million depending on equipment selection and other factors.  
    
This being the case, if we were to select the low cost option and operate DMU’s along the line and assume an average fair revenue of $20 per person the line is virtually a break-even operation at inception
as envisioned in my original report.  Furthermore if you take into consideration that rail introduction into Barrie was anticipated to lure 250 riders per day at inception and only a few years after inception is in
fact yielding in excess of 550 riders per day, it is reasonable to assume that the ridership projections used to determine operational viability are similarly understated.
 
Why does the report both select the highest cost rolling stock option and assume no ticket fair revenues?  Is it reasonable to suggest to government that the line will require a $25 million annual opera-
tions subsidy when anyone can see that it is simply not the case?  Why does their official report not indicate that they are assuming people are riding for free on the most expensive rolling stock option considered?
 
In conclusion, I would like to make the following observations.
 
Independent third party analysis demonstrates that this project can be completed including all costs within the amount of funds budgeted and is largely consistent with the findings of Hatch Mott MacDonald.
 
Ridership projections are strong and actual experience is likely to be much stronger based on similar regional experience.
   
Once established and properly designed, this line will operate without on-going government subsidy encouraging sound environmental practices and driving significant economic development throughout the entire eastern greater golden horseshoe region.
 
The findings of the Metrolinx report are inconsistent with these facts and should have been incorporated into the report prior to its ultimate completion. Taken at its face value, the Metrolinx report will block the completion of this project.  
 
If this project is not completed, the KLR faces a similar situation being confronted by virtually all other Ontario short-line railways.  Without government support, the KLR will eventually be decommissioned and freight rail service to our regions employers will be lost forever.
 
It falls to elected leaders to make decisions - not the authors of reports.” stated MP Del Mastro.  “I will insure that both Federal and Provincial decision makers have the best possible information to base this decision upon.  I have been elected to advocate and fight on behalf of my constituents—not simply to accept report findings that hurt our region’s future.   It will be incumbent on both the federal and provincial governments to review all of the information pertaining to this project and make the right decision.